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Why language really is not a
communication system: a cognitive
view of language evolution
Anne C. Reboul*
CNRS UMR 5304, Laboratory on Language, Brain and Cognition (L2C2), Institute for Cognitive Sciences-Marc Jeannerod,
Bron, France
While most evolutionary scenarios for language see it as a communication system with
consequences on the language-ready brain, there are major difficulties for such a view.
First, language has a core combination of features—semanticity, discrete infinity, and
decoupling—that makes it unique among communication systems and that raise deep
problems for the view that it evolved for communication. Second, extant models of
communication systems—the code model of communication (Millikan, 2005) and the
ostensive model of communication (Scott-Phillips, 2015) cannot account for language
evolution. I propose an alternative view, according to which language first evolved as
a cognitive tool, following Fodor’s (1975, 2008) Language of Thought Hypothesis, and
was then exapted (externalized) for communication. On this view, a language-ready
brain is a brain profoundly reorganized in terms of connectivity, allowing the human
conceptual system to emerge, triggering the emergence of syntax. Language as used in
communication inherited its core combination of features from the Language of Thought.
Keywords: language evolution, language-ready brain, communication, code model, ostensive model, Language
of Thought, globularity
Introduction
Language evolution has been mainly approached through the evolutionary notion of function. As
language is routinely used in human communication, the natural assumption is that the function
of language is communication. As a consequence, theories of language evolution have centered on
scenarios that try to explain the kinds of selection pressures that could have triggered the emergence
of this rather remarkable communication system. Inevitably given that communication is the
epitome of a social phenomenon, these scenarios have been “social”1. However, seeing language as
a system of communication and proposing that it has evolved as a system of communication (i.e.,
seeing language as being a system of communication in the strong sense) rather than being merely
used in communication (i.e., seeing it as being a system of communication in the weak sense) raises
a host of diﬃcult issues which have to do with the very nature of language. The question of whether
language is or is not a communication system in the strong sense that it evolved for communication
is far from anecdotal as its answer strongly constrains what a language-ready brain would comprise
in terms of necessary preliminary cognitive abilities.
1Számado and Szathmáry (2006) list eleven diﬀerent scenarios (gossip, grooming, group bonding/ritual, hunting, language
as a mental tool, pair bonding, motherese, sexual selection, song, status for information, and tool making), only one of
which—language as a mental tool—is clearly and unquestionably non-social.
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That language is eccentric among animal communication
systems cannot be seriously disputed. It has a core combination
of features—semanticity, discrete inﬁnity, and decoupling—that
is found nowhere else in nature to our present knowledge
(Chomsky, 1966/2009). Relative to the evolution of language as
a system of communication, this core combination of features
raises two major diﬃculties:
(a) Given that it gives rise to linguistic creativity (the potential
production of an inﬁnite number of diﬀerent sentences with
diﬀerent contents), it must be explained why humans—and
only humans—need to be able to communicate a potential
inﬁnity of diﬀerent contents;
(b) We are also owed an explanation of how, given that
decoupling facilitates cheating and deceiving, while the
evolution of communication systems is subject to stringent
constraints of honesty (see Animal Communication
Systems), a communication system that incorporates
decoupling could ever get oﬀ the ground.
As Számado and Szathmáry (2006) have noted, none of the
extant scenarios can satisfactorily answer these two questions2.
Given these possibly intractable diﬃculties, it makes sense to
reexamine the evidence in favor of the conclusion that language
is a communication system and that it has evolved as a
communication system.
Thus, the main goal of this paper is to assess the notion
that language is a communication system in the strong sense.
Here, a few words (for a complete presentation, see Animal
Communication Systems) about what a communication system
is are in order. The traditional view of communication systems
is the code model3: the communicator encodes the message
she wants to communicate, this encoded message is relayed
along a channel to the receiver who decodes it and recovers
the intended message. Though it is generally considered that
this applies fairly well to animal communication systems4 (see
Animal Communication Systems), there are serious doubts that
it can apply to the use of language in human communication.
This is because, as has been abundantly argued (Sperber and
Wilson, 1995; Carston, 2002; Recanati, 2004, 2010, following in
the steps of Grice, 1989), on the whole, the semantic meaning of
an utterance (the sentence meaning) fails to correspond exactly
to what the speaker intended to communicate (the speaker’s
meaning). In other words, encoding–decoding processes are
not suﬃcient to recover the message. While this contextualist
position is by now largely acknowledged in both philosophy
of language and linguistics, it did not penetrate the ﬁeld of
language evolution until very recently, when Scott-Phillips (2015)
proposed a new view of language evolution. According to him,
there are two main roads to the evolution of a system of
communication:
2Basically, the two questions above subsume the four questions proposed in
Számado and Szathmáry (2006).
3Generally considered to have its origins in Shannon and Weaver’s (1949) theory
of information.
4Though for a dissenting view, see Owren et al. (2010) and Section “Animal
Communication Systems”.
(a) Almost all communication systems (i.e., animal
communication systems) are congruent with a description
in terms of the code model of communication and have
evolved, independently of any social abilities, either
biologically or culturally, signal by signal;
(b) A single other communication system (i.e., language) is
an ostensive communication system5, and developed as
a system on top of an ostensive-inferential communicative
mechanism (based on the social ability of mind reading)
through the establishment of a set of linguistic conventions.
In other words, while, on the code model view of language,
it is continuous with all other animal communication systems, on
the ostensive view of language, it is discontinuous with all other
animal communication systems.
Obviously, arguments against the codemodel view of language
as a communication system may well be inoperative against
the ostensive view of language as a communication system.
Thus, both theoretical frameworks will have to be examined,
and we will begin with the most popular one, i.e., the code
model.
Language as a Communication System
under the Code Model
As we have just seen, under the code model of communication,
language is continuous with animal communication systems,
and here it is useful to make a brief incursion into animal
communication systems.
Animal Communication Systems
Though whole books have been written on the subject of the
evolution of communication in animals (e.g., Hauser, 1996; Oller
and Griebel, 2004), their authors have often been content to
use the word without giving it a precise deﬁnition. They rely
on its vernacular meaning and on a rather vague notion of
information transfer6, waving at Shannon and Weaver’s (1949)
quantitative deﬁnition of information. As pointed out by Owren
et al. (2010), this is usually accompanied by the idea that
this transfer of information is based on an encoding (on the
signaler’s side) and a decoding (on the receiver’s side) process7.
It is this view of communication as information transfer that
makes honesty central to the evolution of communication
systems.
Another line of thought was opened by Krebs and Dawkins
(1984), who claim that the root of the evolution of animal
communication lies in manipulation, linking the sending of
a signal (the unit of animal communication systems) to a
response (by the recipient) advantageous to the signaler. This
5I leave a more complete presentation of an ostensive system of communication to
Section“Language as a Communication System under the OstensiveModel” below,
where Scott-Phillips’ proposal will be discussed.
6Cheney and Seyfarth’s (1990) classical analysis of vervet monkeys’ alarm calls is
an example of that strategy.
7This is where the investigation into animal communication systems meets with
the code model of communication.
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view of communication was clearly inﬂuential, as shown by
Maynard Maynard Smith and Harper (2003, p. 3) deﬁnition of
a signal:
“We deﬁne a ‘signal’ as any act or structure which alters the
behaviour of other organisms, which evolved because of that
eﬀect, and which is eﬀective because the receiver’s response has
also evolved.”
In other words, the evolution of communication is not the
evolution of the signal in isolation, but rather of pairs of signal–
responses. This might be thought to go all the way toward a
manipulation account of communication, but this is not the
case. In the comments that follow, Maynard Smith and Harper
outline some consequences of their deﬁnition that put them
squarely on the information transfer side. First, if the signal
aﬀects the receiver’s behavior, it must do so in a way that is not,
on the whole, detrimental to the receiver (otherwise selection
would rapidly eliminate receptivity to it). Second, this means,
on Maynard Smith and Harper’s view, that the signal must
reliably and honestly (truthfully) convey information about the
environment or about the signaler’s present state and/or future
behavior. In other words, the signal evolved for its behavior-
altering eﬀects, but that does not mean that it does not carry
information.
A stronger challenge to the information-based studies of
communication has developed, however, through a series of
papers by Owren et al. (2010, for a synthetic presentation),
initially inspired by Krebs and Dawkins (1984), but presenting
an alternative, rather than a mere addition to the information-
based view. Owren et al.’s (2010) most convincing examples
are mating signals. While mating signals have generally been
analyzed in the information-based literature as transmitting
information to females about males’ genetic worth8, Owren et al.
(2010) propose an alternative view. Mating signals, whether
visual, auditory, etc., are (in general) not informing the receiver
of the signaler’s genetic quality, nor is it their function to do so.
Rather, mating signals exploit pre-existing sensory preferences
of females. These preferences usually have evolved in entirely
diﬀerent contexts (e.g., foraging for food), but once evolved
they are ripe for exploitation. Thus, mating signs directly
impinge on females’ sensory systems, and did not evolve for
the purpose of transmitting (reliable) information about the
signaler’s genetic value. It is important to note that Owren
et al. (2010) do not exclude the possibility that mating signals
may occasionally carry (reliable) information about the signaler’s
genetic worth. Rather, if they do so, this is incidental. Their
main function, which explains why they evolved, is not to
signal ﬁtness, but to attract females. This, basically, is Owren
et al.’s (2010) alternative view of animal communication: its
main function is not to transfer information between organisms,
but to induce behaviors in the receiver that are advantageous
to the communicator. Eschewing the negatively loaded term
manipulation, they propose an inﬂuence-based view of animal
communication.
8Given their greater biological investment in reproduction in the vertebrate and
even more in the mammal species, females are generally the “choosy” sex.
This is clearly not the place to settle that debate (the
interested reader is directed to the papers in Stegmann,
2013), but there one thing worth pointing out. While Owren
et al. (2010) rightly deplore the detrimental eﬀect on the
animal communication literature of the (language-inspired)
information-based approach, one may equally deplore the eﬀects
on the language evolution literature of an approach based on
animal communication9, however, tainted by (mis-)conceptions
of human language.
One of the best examples of a view of language evolution
that sees language as continuous with animal communication
systems, in keeping with the code model, is Millikan’s account of
language and its evolution. I will mainly discuss her most recent
book centering on language (Millikan, 2005).
Millikan’s Account
Millikan’s approach to language belongs to the presently
inﬂuential philosophical program aiming at “naturalizing” the
mental10, concerning both mental representations and their
communicative counterparts. In a move that has become classical
in such programs, she aims at establishing a continuity between
natural signs or meaning and non-natural signs or meaning.
The distinction between some form of natural signiﬁcation
(based on correlations that are, more often than not, grounded in
causality) and linguistic signiﬁcation is far from new, but it was
given a paramount importance in Grice’s (1989) classical analysis
of meaning, which is also Millikan’s main target. Grice’s strategy
was to look at two uses of the verb to mean. Thus, he began by
comparing the following examples:
(1) These spots mean (meant) measles.
(2) These three rings on the bus bell mean (meant) that the bus
is full.
While in the ﬁrst example, the verb to mean is used in its
natural sense, in the second, it is used in its non-natural sense.
Grice noted that these two uses of the verb are distinguished
by the implications that one is entitled to draw from each of
them. While natural meaning is factive, in the sense that x means
(meant) p entails p, non-natural meaning (henceforthmeaningnn)
is non-factive in the sense that x meansnn p does not entail p.
On the other hand, meaningnn is under voluntary control in
the sense that from x meansnn p one can deduce that Someone
meantnn p by x. However, natural meaning is not under voluntary
control (it does not license the corresponding inference). So,
in short, natural meaning is factive and not under voluntary
control while meaningnn is non-factive and under voluntary
control.
Grice (1989, p. 219) went further, however, and added the
following deﬁnition of meaningnn:
“A meantnn something by x” is roughly equivalent to “A intended
the utterance of x to produce some eﬀect in an audience by means
of the recognition of that intention.”
9Interestingly, in their paper, Owren et al. (2010) strongly suggest that language
and animal communication are entirely disjoint phenomena, a view with which I
concur.
10Initiated by Dretske (1981).
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In other words, meaningnn is not only under voluntary
control: additionally, the speaker has a double intention:
• The primary intention to produce a given eﬀect in her
audience;
• The secondary intention to produce that eﬀect via the
audience’s recognition of her (the speaker’s) primary
intention.
Grice was at pain to emphasize that the primary intention
is crucial to the deﬁnition: cases where the audience recognizes
the meaning without recognizing the primary intention are
not cases of meaningnn. Additionally, Grice insisted that,
though meaningnn could be conventional, it did not have
to be conventional. In other words, on Grice’s view, normal
linguistic communication is not a matter of encoding and
decoding as such, but rather of recognizing the speaker’s primary
intention.
Grice’s account of meaningnn has been Millikan’s target all
along her philosophical career (the ﬁrst instance was Millikan,
1984). Her goal has been to show that the psychological
side of Gricean meaningnn is not necessary, that linguistic
communication is indeed a matter of encoding–decoding and
that meaning is conventional in a utterly non-psychological
sense11. In other words, what distinguishes natural signs or
meaning from non-natural signs or meaning is only factivity,
not volition: natural signs are factive, non-natural signs are not
(the signaler may be mistaken or deceptive). Thus, Millikan’s
distinction between natural and non-natural meaning is wholly
non-psychological.
Millikan’s account of meaning centrally uses the notion of
function, explicitly borrowed from evolutionary biology. Millikan
(1984) introduces the notion of proper function, which is
fundamentally historical in the following sense: it does not
refers to what an entity (be it an organ or a behavior) actually
does, but rather to why that entity not only exists now, but
has persisted (possibly with modiﬁcations) since its emergence,
in other words, why it has been selected for. So whatever
the state of your heart, and regardless of whether it actually
reliably pumps blood throughout your body, its proper function
is to pump blood, because this is the reason why hearts have
evolved, been preserved (and improved) throughout vertebrate
history. Note that proper functions are not limited to biological
organisms: they can also characterize artifacts of all kinds,
from institutions to tools. In other words, they can be the
product of either biological or cultural evolution. The essential
thing is that the entity considered has a history which explains
why it persisted throughout time by the function it normally
performs.
On Millikan’s view, language is a communication system,
on a par with the other animal communication systems, as
far as its evolution is concerned. She shares with Maynard
Smith and Harper’s (2003) deﬁnition of a signal the idea
that signals evolve in tandem with responses (indeed, she
views language as the solution to coordination problems in
11Which is where she parts ways with Lewis, 1969/2002 account of convention.
humans12). Her idea is that the proper function of a signal is
to evoke a speciﬁc response in the receiver, and that it does
so through information transfer13. While clearly the notion of
information transfer involved applies to natural language as well
as to animal communication systems, Millikan acknowledges
that linguistic signals and animal signals are diﬀerent up to
a point. This can be seen through her analysis (Millikan,
2004) of vervet alarm calls. In linguistic terms, such calls
(e.g., the leopard call) have a double direction of ﬁt: both
world-to-signal (i.e., the call reﬂects the current state of the
environment, e.g., the presence of a leopard in it) and signal-
to-world (i.e., the signal simultaneously enjoins the recipient to
give a speciﬁc response, e.g., ﬂying to the top of the canopy).
Millikan proposes to call such double-directed signals pushmi-
pullyu representations. As Millikan (2013) herself concedes, it
does not make any sense to “translate” animal signals into
language. For instance, the vervet leopard alarm call is in no
way equivalent to the complex sentence “There is a leopard
here and you must climb to the top of the nearest tree”.
Though this might reﬂect fairly faithfully the meaning of
the call, it is not a translation, because animal signals are,
on the whole, holistic14: the signal means something as a
whole, not as a combination of its parts. Indeed, as Millikan
acknowledges, it is only with language that the two directions of
ﬁt (indication =world-to-signal and direction = signal-to-world)
become diﬀerentiated.
Thus, Millikan acknowledges that animal signals are
bidirectional, but linguistic utterances are not. I will now
turn to a criticism of Millikan’s position, using two kinds of
arguments: general arguments regarding the very notion of a
linguistic signal in signal-information/response pairings, and
pragmatic arguments regarding signal-information/response
pairings.
Some Difficulties with Millikan’s Position
The very structure of Millikan’s theory raises major diﬃculties
and those diﬃculties are all linked, in one way or another, to the
essential historicity of Millikan’s notion of signal, inherited from
her notion of proper function. Basically, for pairings such as those
that Millikan proposes as the origin of signals to occur, the signal-
type, the information-type, and the response-type each have to be
perennial and the repeated couplings between signals of that type,
information of that type and responses of that type also have to be
perennial.
12Again, though she borrows the term coordination problem from Lewis,
1969/2002, there is very little left of Lewis’ account of convention in Millikan’s
theory. I will not discuss this here, as it is hardly central to my main purpose.
13Subject to the same strictures as mentioned by Maynard Smith and Harper
(2003): while the response must be advantageous for the sender, it must not
be generally detrimental to the receiver, otherwise selection would eliminate
receptivity to it. This led Maynard Smith and Harper to the (correct) conclusion
that, on such an account, the evolution of signals is bound by honesty constraints.
14There is evidence that some monkey species occasionally combine two calls to
produce amodiﬁed meaning (Zuberbühler, 2002). These fairly limited phenomena
are still poorly understood (for an intriguing pragmatic account, see Schlenker
et al., 2014), but they hardly challenge the huge diﬀerence in compositionality
between animal communication system and language (the only example of fairly
sophisticated combinatoriality is birdsong, which, however, is not semantically
compositional).
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This raises diﬃculties for the three main components of the
pairings:
• Signals;
• Information;
• Responses.
I will examine them one after the other.
Signals
A ﬁrst and major question is what a linguistic signal should be.
Under Millikan’s broad deﬁnition of a signal, something is a
signal if its proper function is to trigger a speciﬁc response in an
audience, through information transfer.
Signals have to be units of communication, i.e., they have
to transfer the information/produce the response in their own
right. Basically, this means that they have not only to be
semantic units, but also have to be communicative units (though
the two normally coincide in holistic animal signals, as we
shall see, they do not in language). Traditionally, it has been
considered that language is doubly articulated15: on a rough
and ready description, at the phonological level, phonemes are
combined into meaningful words; at the syntactic level, words
are combined into meaningful sentences. Clearly, phonemes,
being semantically vacant, are not semantic units, and hence not
signals. So, the ﬁrst candidates for signals are words. On the
face of it, they seem to be good candidates: they are perennial
enough both in their forms and in their meanings16. The main
problem with words is that, while they are semantic units, they
are not communicative units. Though shouting “Fire!” may be a
perfectly well-formed communicative act in some circumstances,
most linguistic communicative acts do not correspond to isolated
words. This leaves us with the sentence, understood as a
utterance-type.
There is, however, a major problem with the notion that
sentences are linguistic signals in the required sense. Couched as
an argument:
Lack of History Argument (Syntactic): Given linguistic
creativity, sentences are fairly often one-oﬀ, that is, they lack
the history necessary to the establishment (through signal-
information pairing due to repeated correlations of signal
and information) of a proper function.
To showwhy this is the case, I will now examine (and reject) an
objection to the notion that language is characterized by linguistic
creativity. This objection targets one of the core properties of
language, i.e., discrete inﬁnity.
It is to the eﬀect that humans being ﬁnite cannot be said
to produce an inﬁnity of diﬀerent sentences. This Finitude
Argument has been formulated as follows by Li and Hombert
(2002, p. 196): “Theoretically the number of possible sentences
in English is indeﬁnitely large because theoretically ‘the longest
15Anderson (2013) rightly points out that this is not, strictly speaking, correct,
given that there is a third articulation at the morphological level. I will ignore this
complication here.
16Obviously, words change both in acoustic form andmeaning with time. But while
this may be a relatively quick process (taking at most decades rather than centuries
or millennia), words still are stable enough to qualify as signals.
English sentence’ does not exist. If one chooses to describe
English syntax or certain aspect of English syntax in terms
of rewriting rules, one can claim that a recursive function is
needed. However, one never conjoins or embeds an indeﬁnitely
large number of sentences in either spoken or written language.
‘Indeﬁnitely large number of sentences’ or ‘inﬁnitely long
sentences’ are theoretical properties.” This seems to rests on
a profound misunderstanding of both discrete inﬁnity and
recursion. To see it, an analogy with another system providing
discrete inﬁnity, i.e., mathematics, is useful. Saying that, because
we do not (and could not, as ﬁnite beings) produce inﬁnitely
long sentences, discrete inﬁnity and recursion are not relevant
features of language is on a par with saying that, because we
do not (and could not) count to inﬁnity, discrete inﬁnity and
recursion are not relevant features of mathematics. The argument
is, to say the least, mystifying. Arguably, recursion is needed to
count up to any number greater than one, just as it is needed
to produce any sentence with an embedding. Once you have the
relevant recursive ability, you have the theoretical possibility of
counting to inﬁnity or to producing inﬁnitely long sentences, and
whether you do it or not is utterly irrelevant. Discrete inﬁnity is a
structural, not a behavioral property. Thus, human ﬁnitude is no
argument against linguistic creativity.
More crucially, the argument is no answer to our worry
regarding the absence of history for sentences. Even though each
human, being a ﬁnite organism, cannot produce an inﬁnity of
diﬀerent sentences with diﬀerent contents, linguistic creativity as
a structural property of language allows each human to produce
sentences diﬀerent from all those produced before, with contents
diﬀerent from all of those produced before. This being so, the fact
that sentences may not have the necessary history to function as
signals in pairs of signal-information/response remains a central
problem. In sum, human ﬁniteness is not an argument against
linguistic creativity and is no answer to the absence of history for
sentences.
This, then, is the ﬁrst major problem for Millikan’s theory
and it is, obviously, a syntactic argument. There are, however,
further objections to her proposal and we will now turn to
information.
Information
Regarding information, Millikan has concentrated on two main
pragmatic phenomena, illocutionary force (Millikan, 1984, 2004,
2005) and implicatures of the scalar variety (Millikan, 2005).
Beginning with the former, from 1984 on, her argument has been
mainly based on the pairing between sentence forms (aﬃrmative,
interrogative, imperative, etc.) and the corresponding speech
acts, covering both information and response. Leaving responses
aside for further discussion later on, let us concentrate on
information17 . The “information” pairing is between sentence
17Setting aside both the evolutionary side of Millikan’s proposal as well as the
pairings between signal and response, it is clear that Millikan’s view of the pairings
between signals and information has much in common with contemporary
constructivist approaches to language acquisition in linguistics (Goldberg, 2006). I
will not discuss constructivism as such here for reasons of space. Note however that
mutatis mutandis, the pragmatic arguments against Millikan’s account also apply to
constructivism.
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form and illocutionary act (or illocutionary force) and, as
Millikan herself acknowledges (following Strawson, 1964), fairly
often, an utterance can be linked to widely diﬀerent illocutionary
forces. Consider (3):
(3) Peter will come tomorrow.
Depending on the circumstances, this can indeed be
interpreted as a promise, a menace, a warning or a prediction.
Millikan proposes to get around this problem through a
multiplicity of (proper) functions. As said above, the proper
function of an entity is not what it actually does but why
it has persisted through time. And even if it is not always
reliably associated with that function, it is suﬃcient that it is
associated with it often enough. Thus, the existence of occasional
functions diﬀerent from the proper function of a sentence is not
a problem. Here, it is interesting to look at Millikan’s view of
language change (which concerns the emergence of implicature
readings). According to Millikan, if a linguistic form with a given
proper function becomes associated often enough with another
diﬀerent function, this second function will become its new or
additional proper function. In other words, the proper function of
a linguistic item depends on the frequency with which this item
is associated with this function and a linguistic signal can have
several functions, proper or otherwise.
Let us look at an example:
(4) The pianist played someMozart sonatas.
Notoriously, this utterance can be given two interpretations:
(5) The pianist played at least some ( = some and maybe all)
Mozart sonatas. [semantic interpretation].
(6) The pianist played only some ( = some and not all) Mozart
sonatas. [pragmatic interpretation].
According to Millikan, the initial proper function of (4)
is to communicate (5). However, (4) is sometimes used to
communicate (6) and, in time, this gives rise to a new function
for (4). In addition to (5), (4) has also the function of
communicating (6).
There is something mysterious about the process, however.
How is it, if the proper function of (4) is to communicate (5),
that, on the ﬁrst occasion of its being used to communicate (6),
the hearer will recognize that this is the case? Here, we turn to a
ﬁrst pragmatic argument:
First Occasion Argument: If meaning is established
through repeated pairings, for such a pairing to take oﬀ,
the meaning of a linguistic signal (or construction) has
to be established on the occasion of its ﬁrst production.
A pragmatic inference will more often than not be
necessary.
Note that the same argument applies to (3) above. Suppose
that the initial function of (3) is to convey the illocutionary force
of prediction. How does (3) acquire the additional functions
of conveying the illocutionary forces of warning, menace of
promise?
A ﬁnal problem to do with ﬁrst occasion arises for those
signals who are associated with a given speaker meaning on a
single occasion (one-oﬀ), as is clearly the case for some creative
metaphors, such as18:
(7) “She smiled herself to an upgrade” (Adams, 1979).
(8) “We laughed our conversation to an end” (Hart, 1992).
In such cases, there is no way to recover the intended meaning
through semantic compositionality, and pragmatic inferences to
the speaker’s intentions are obviously necessary.
This is not the only diﬃculty, however. If a single linguistic
signal can have several (proper) functions, this approach leads
to widespread ambiguity in linguistic signals. And this suggests
a second pragmatic argument:
Ambiguity Argument19: This approach supposes
widespread ambiguity in linguistic signals. The resolution
of that ambiguity will have to be done through pragmatic
inferences.
Note, however, that what is central to Millikan’s view is
not the absence of context-based pragmatic inference per se,
but rather the absence of the Gricean kind of pragmatic
inferences. Speciﬁcally what this means is that Millikan does not
reject contextualism as such but that she rejects any brand of
contextualism in which either the context includes psychological
representations (e.g., speaker’s intentions or beliefs) or the
interpretation process leads to psychological representations
(e.g., By X, the speaker meant Y).
Here, it is interesting to go back to Millikan’s analysis of
natural signs. As she notes, while natural signs do not have
proper functions, they are nevertheless paired with types of
information: smoke and the presence of a ﬁre, clouds and
future rain, etc. However, while natural signs are factive, they
are not necessarily paired bi-univocally with the information
they convey. Sometimes, two diﬀerent natural signs with
identical forms will be associated with two diﬀerent informations
depending on which environment each of them occurs in. Let
us take an example. It so happens that identical tracks can be
left by, e.g., a small bird and a small rodent. However, in wood
A, there are only birds and no rodents, while in wood B, there
are only rodents and no birds. Thus, natural signs with the same
form will be read (factively) as corresponding to birds in wood A
and to rodents in wood B. In other words, even natural signs can
be context-dependent relative to the information they convey.
If this is the case, why not apply the same solution (context-
dependency) to sentences? Sentences would always be associated
with context types, and utterance types would correspond not
to sentences, but to couples of sentences and context-types. It is
these composite utterance types that would be paired with proper
functions, rather than sentences in isolation. And, obviously,
such composite utterance types would make perfect sense as
signals in signal-information/response pairs. Note that on such
18Strangely, these are given by Goldberg (2006, p. 6) as examples of constructions,
that is as examples of repeated pairings between forms and functions.
19This argument was ﬁrst opposed toMillikan’s view (though not under that name)
by Origgi and Sperber (2000).
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a view (which reﬂects Millikan’s see Millikan, 2004, Chap. 10),
nothing like a Gricean “psychological” account is needed. The
type of contexts concerned do not include any representation of
the speaker’s intentions or beliefs, or indeed, of anyone’s mental
states.
Let us now come back to example (3) above. As said before,
a sentence such as Peter will come tomorrow may be understood
as a promise, a menace, a warning or a prediction. Can we make
sense of this in terms of utterance type, i.e., in terms of couples
of sentences and (non-psychological) context types? In this
speciﬁc case, it seems rather diﬃcult to distinguish between these
diﬀerent illocutionary forces without appealing to mental states
in both the speaker and the hearer. Presumably, leaving aside the
fairly neutral speech act of prediction, what illocutionary force
such an utterance will have will very much depend, not only on
the speaker’s intention but also on what she knows, or believes
she knows, about her hearer’s mental attitudes to Peter’s coming.
The same reasoning applies to (4): whether it will be interpreted
as (5) or (6) will depend at least in part on the intention the hearer
attributes to the speaker.
In other words, the requirement that the context be non-
psychological seems a gratuitous complication as far as linguistic
communication is concerned, as distinguishing between diﬀerent
illocutionary forces will, more often than not, depend on the
representation of the relevant attitudes in the speaker, the hearer
or both. There is yet another worry, which again, goes back
to the ﬁrst occasion argument. Given that utterance types are
themselves composite, being couples of sentences and context
types, one can also ask how such couples come into existence,
leading to a higher order ﬁrst occasion problem. This problem is
especially acute for linguistic communication, given decoupling,
which allows speakers to speak of absent or non-existent objects,
introducing a further diﬃculty as both the signal and its referent
have to be present for any association process to operate.
Hence, neither the assumption of widespread ambiguity
for sentences, nor the assumption of composite utterance
types, leading to semantic inﬂation, can work given
psychological parsimony. Basically, exchanging semantic
parsimony + psychological inﬂation, as proposed by
Grice, for semantic inﬂation + psychological parsimony, as
proposed by Millikan, is not tenable. Whether one goes for
semantic parsimony or for semantic inﬂation, one cannot
escape psychological inﬂation. Thus, it does not seem that
composite utterance types can play the role of signals in
signal-information/response pairs either.
Responses
Let me now come to my third objection to Millikan, relative
to the response type associated with the signal. Going back
to Millikan’s central example, speech acts, the “information”
pairing is between sentence form and illocutionary act, but the
“response” pairing is between sentence form and perlocutionary
act. Here, it is important to see why Millikan shares with
Maynard Smith and Harper the view that it is not signals that
have evolved, but rather signal–response pairs. This makes sense
on an evolutionary view (be it biological or cultural) because,
while conveying information does not as such make sense in
evolutionary terms (information is a precious commodity, so
why share it?), triggering responses in others, as long as these
responses are advantageous to the signaler, makes perfect sense.
So, on a view such as Millikan’s, according to which language
is a communication system, it seems reasonable to see linguistic
signals (whatever they are) as paired with responses rather than
only with information.
Millikan’s main example is assertion, which, on the response
side, is, according to her, paired with receiver’s belief. Obviously,
not all assertions lead to receiver’s belief, but, as indicated
above, for the pairing between assertion and receiver’s belief
to be established (or, in other words, for receiver’s belief to be
the proper function of assertion), it is suﬃcient that assertion
be paired with belief often enough. Here, I want to discuss
the appropriateness of belief as a receiver’s response in an
evolutionary perspective.
On the face of it, it would seem that any receiver’s response in
signal–response pairs should be detectable if the pairing is to have
evolved20:
Detectability of Response Argument: for signal-response
pairings to get oﬀ the ground, both the signal and the
response must be detectable (respectively, by the receiver
and by the signaler).
The problem with belief is not only that it is a mental state
(and as such less easy to detect than a behavior or an action); it
is in addition especially diﬃcult to detect among mental states.
While intentions are fairly often obvious from bodily preparation
for action21, and emotions or feelings are detectable through
facial expressions, belief seems to be wholly internal and not
linked to any speciﬁc exteriorization22 . One could argue of course
that, given a belief with a certain content in her hearer, the
speaker can detect its presence through his behavior interpreted
via Theory of Mind, i.e., via the attribution of mental states. This,
however, not only seems uncertain (see below), it also is not clear
whether Millikan would agree with such a development, which
is tantamount to re-introducing a rather Gricean (psychological)
factor in the evolution of communication. Thus, belief appears
to be a fairly strange candidate for a response in signal–response
pairings.
This, however, is only a ﬁrst objection. A second, and
potentially more decisive objection is that responses, on such a
view, have to be advantageous to the signaler (or, in the case of
language, to the speaker). But belief as such is not advantageous
to the speaker. Rather it is the behavioral consequences of the
receiver’s belief (his deciding “to act on his belief”, so to speak)
that may be advantageous to her. But, how exactly a hearer will
act on his belief will depend on a host of other things, including
his other beliefs and his desires, which strongly underdetermines
the behavioral consequences of his (speaker induced) belief. Let
20No association is possible otherwise.
21It seems indeed to be the mental state that most animals or young children detect
fairly easily, though perhaps in less mental terms such as goal or purpose.
22This may be because belief is phenomenologically vacant: there is nothing it
is like to believe something outside of religious or quasi-religious (e.g., political,
esthetic, and ethical) belief.
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us suppose, for instance, that John wants to go, while Mary wants
him to stay. Mary could say:
(9) It is raining.
While the belief that it is raining might indeed induce John to
stay, it might equally wellmake him take his umbrella, phone for a
taxi or do a number of other things, none of which is staying, and
none of which is what Mary wishes him to do. In other words,
even in such simple cases, hearer’s behavioral responses are far
from being obvious and there is certainly no way to predict them
with any degree of certainty. And linguistic communication is of
course far from being limited to such simple circumstances. In
other words:
Underdetermination of Behavioral Response Argument:
In humans at least, the automaticity or even the frequency
of a given response to a given linguistic signal is largely
underdetermined, undermining the pairing of signals and
responses.
So Millikan’s choice of example, associating a linguistic signal
(assertion) with a response that is a mental state (belief) can
be explained through the fact that human action is not so
automatic that it can be reliably associated with signals, barring
imperatives in such strongly authoritative circumstances that
the hearer has no choice but to comply. This, however, has
two fairly negative consequences for her view of the evolution
of linguistic communication: ﬁrst, mental states are not the
most detectable of responses, which raises a major diﬃculty for
a signal-response pairing account such as hers (Detectability
of Response Argument); second, mental states are additionally
only indirectly advantageous to the speaker: they can only be
advantageous to her if they lead her hearer to a behavior that
she wants him to perform, but this is uncertain in most cases
(Underdetermination of Response Argument).
Thus, Millikan’s endeavor to “de-psychologize” language and
range it among all other animal communication systems fails. We
will now turn to Scott-Phillips’s (2015) highly diﬀerent view of
language as a communication system.
Language as a Communication System
under the Ostensive Model
Ostensive communication, a notion that Scott-Phillips borrows
from Sperber and Wilson (1995), corresponds to the view
that human communication is intimately linked to the crucial
notion of relevance. Relevance is a minimax notion and the
communicative version of relevance goes as follows:
Relevance: An utterance is relevant to the extent that:
• It is less costly to interpret;
• It produces cognitive eﬀects.
The cognitive eﬀects produced by the interpretation of an
utterance can be of three sorts: strengthening or weakening the
conviction with which previous assumptions are entertained;
deleting a previous assumption that is contradicted by the
new information obtained (depending on the conﬁdence the
hearer places in the speaker); producing new assumptions. The
Communicative Principle of Relevance23 says:
Every utterance carries the guarantee of its own optimal
relevance.
Optimal relevance is achieved when the cognitive eﬀects of
an utterance balance its interpretive costs. The reason why
utterances carry the guarantee of their own optimal relevance
is because any utterance is an instance of ostensive-inferential
communication. A behavior is an act of ostensive-inferential
communication in as much as it makes it obvious to the
receiver that the signaler has produced it with a communicative
intention—this is the ostension part—and it is produced as
evidence to be used in the inferential process through which
the receiver will recover the signaler’s informative intention (i.e.,
the content she intended to communicate)—this is the inference
part. Thus, an act of ostensive communication guarantees that
it is worthwhile for the hearer to pay attention to it. Hence,
by putting ostensive-inferential communication at the heart,
not only of linguistic communication, but, as we shall now
see, of language evolution, Scott-Phillips is taking a position
which is the opposite of Millikan’s relative to language. Millikan’s
rejection of inferential pragmatics and insistence on signal–
response pairings makes her analysis unable to deal with the
semantic underdetermination that is characteristic of linguistic
communication. Scott-Phillips’ proposal can deal with it. But, as
we shall see, it does more than that: his proposal basically reverses
the problem.
At the center of Scott-Phillips’ view is a distinction between
natural codes (which correspond to what Millikan describes)
and conventional codes (which do not). The originality of Scott-
Phillips’ proposal is to see ostensive communication (a short-
hand for ostensive-inferential communication) not as a way of
solving the problem of the semantic underdetermination of the
conventional linguistic code (which would thus still be the basic
root of linguistic communication), but as itself the root of human,
including linguistic, communication, the conventional codes
constituting language as a system being added to give human
communication more expressive power. In other words (Scott-
Phillips, 2015, p. 577), “there is a qualitative diﬀerence between
the codes used in the code model, and the linguistic code. Put
simply, one makes a type of communication possible, the other
makes a diﬀerent type of communication expressively powerful.”
Conventional codes are ubiquitous in language, being found
at the phonological, lexical, syntactic and even pragmatic (e.g.,
politeness conventions) levels. Scott-Phillips (2015, pp. 628–629)
concludes: “This view of a language as a set of conventional codes
that augments ostensive communication recognizes both the
pragmatic foundations of linguistic behavior, and the importance
and nature of the conventions that make languages diﬀerent to
other, simpler cases of ostensive-inferential communication, such
as points, non-linguistic vocalizations, nods of the head, and so
on.”
So, to sum up, on Scott-Philipps’ view, language is indeed a
communication system, but it is a communication system entirely
23There is also a Cognitive Principle of Relevance, which we will ignore here.
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discontinuous with most if not all animal communication
systems as it has evolved in the wake of abilities for ostensive
communication that themselves depend on the previous
evolution of a sophisticated Theory of Mind, developed on
the basis of pre-existing primate abilities in social cognition,
but outstripping them by far. Language itself is a collection
of conventional codes, which greatly enhance the expressive
power of ostensive communication, but which, nevertheless, are
still in need of pragmatic inferencing, as they are, more often
than not, semantically underdetermined relative to speaker’s
meaning.
There is no doubt that Scott-Phillips’ proposal diﬀers in many
ways from Millikan’s. There is, however, one point on which
they seem to meet. It is highly diﬃcult, from Scott-Phillips’
presentation to see where exactly his conventional codes would
diﬀer from constructions, and, as we have seen, Millikan is
also something of a constructivist. What is more, Scott-Philipps
adopts a few other constructivist tenets. For instance in his
ﬁfth chapter, he rejects the Chomskyan notion of Universal
Grammar24, which he sees as unnecessary. He also rejects the
idea that recursion is a central factor in syntax and in linguistic
creativity, though he seems to accept linguistic creativity in as
much as he claims that linguistic communication is unlimited
in the number of diﬀerent contents language may be used to
communicate.
This is not the only aspect in which Scott-Phillips’ theory
meets Millikan’s. Another important meeting point between the
two accounts is the notion of a signal-response pair as the
basic communicative unit. Basically, Scott-Phillips distinguishes
between signals, cues, coercion, accidents, by whether or not the
behavior is designed to give rise to (designed) responses. In the
case of a signal (the only communicative unit), the signal is
designed to trigger the designed response (very much in keeping
with Maynard Smith and Harper’s deﬁnition, see Language as
a Communication System under the Code Model). The cue is
not designed to trigger the response, though the response is
designed as a response to that type of cue. In coercion the action is
designed to trigger the response, but the response is not designed
as a response to that type of action. And ﬁnally in an accident,
neither the accident nor the response are designed relative to one
another.
Given these two important points of agreement between
Millikan’s and Scott-Phillips’ views, it makes sense to ask whether
Scott-Phillips’ proposal falls foul of the objections raised above
against Millikan’s. Obviously, the pragmatic objections (First
Occasion Argument and Ambiguity Argument) do not apply.
But, as we shall see, both the Lack of History Argument and the
Underdetermination of Behavioral Response Argument do apply
to Scott-Phillips’ theory.
As discussed above, any theory that deﬁnes communicative
units as the result of pairings between signals and
information/responses ipso facto supposes perenniality in
signal types, in information types, in response types and
24Though Scott-Phillips acknowledges that there may well be linguistic universals,
he proposes to explain them through Cultural Attraction Theory, not Universal
Grammar.
in the pairings that link them. Scott-Phillips diﬀers from
Millikan in acknowledging from the start that the information
communicated by diﬀerent utterances of a given sentence
will diﬀer from occasion to occasion, and he does not
explain this through widespread ambiguity. He explains it
through the deep semantic underdetermination of linguistic
(conventional) codes. This deep underdetermination aﬀects
speaker’s meaning, and makes it necessary for the conventional
codes to be supplemented by pragmatic inference. While on
Scott-Phillips’ model, pragmatic inference is available, this
nevertheless means that diﬀerent utterances of the same sentence
will not be repeatedly paired with the same information.
This leads us to a pragmatic version of the Lack of History
Argument:
Lack of History Argument (Pragmatic): Given semantic
underdetermination, the speaker meaning attributed to one
utterance of a given sentence will often be one-oﬀ, that is,
it will not necessarily be attributed to any other utterance
of the same sentence. In other words, utterances lack
the semantic stability necessary to the establishment of a
conventional code.
Let us now turn to responses. The example Scott-Phillips
gives of a signal is of a man pushing a woman down under
the eyes of another colleague, who laughs in response25. The
pushing was intended to be seen by the laughing colleague and
thus it is a communicative signal designed to trigger as its
designed response the laughter. While this example is certainly
not susceptible to the Detectability of Response Argument
(laughter being detectable), it nevertheless is susceptible to the
Underdetermination of Behavioral Responses Argument. Rather
obviously, the intended receiver might have remonstrated instead
of laughing.
Thus, while Scott-Phillips oﬀers an original and attractive
theory, it falls foul of some of the same diﬃculties that plague
Millikan’s. My diagnosis is that this can basically be explained
by the fact that these diﬃculties come from what the basic
proposition shared by the two views is: that language is a
communication system.
The Language-ready Brain
The proposition that language is a communication system
imposes obvious constraints on the abilities that have to pre-
exist for language to get oﬀ the ground. Unsurprisingly, given
that communication is the epitome of a social phenomenon,
these abilities are social. On the code model, the main constraint
is honesty (see Animal Communication Systems)—and this is
all the more important in language, given the opportunities for
cheating that decoupling oﬀers. This has led to the view that
altruism, as a phylogenetic pro-social tendency, is a prerequisite
for human linguistic communication and for language evolution.
On the ostensive model, linguistic communication and language
25He rightly notes that under his view one and the same behavioral token could be
at one a signal, a cue, coercion and an accident depending on who observes it.
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evolution basically depend on the preexistence of a Theory of
Mind of some kind. However, as we have just seen, the notion
that language is a communication system in the strong sense
that it evolved for communication is implausible in view of
the diﬃculties it meets with. One fairly obvious suggestion to
account for its use in human communication is that it originally
evolved for entirely diﬀerent purposes and was then exapted
(Gould and Vrba, 1982) for communication. Determining
what those purposes were is a prerequisite for determining
which pre-existing abilities should comprise the language-ready
brain.
Here, recall the two questions listed in Section “Introduction”,
and more speciﬁcally the question of why humans—and only
humans—need a system of communication that allows them
to communicate a potential inﬁnity of diﬀerent contents.
Communication is rife in nature, but language is unique. This
immediately raises a further question: where does this inﬁnity
of diﬀerent contents come from? As Millikan (2013) rightly
notes, human cognitive sophistication is also unique. Thus, one
potential answer to the question above is that a cognitively
sophisticated species needs an appropriately sophisticated system
of communication. What this means basically is that human
intelligence, rather than human sociability, is the key to language.
We can go one step further, however, following Fodor and
Pylyshyn (2015), and note that thoughts and sentences share
the same structural organization: just as sentences structurally
compose words in a creative way, thoughts structurally compose
concepts in a creative way. Language is creative, because
thought is creative. Or, in Fodor and Pylyshyn (2015, p. 89)
words, “That thoughts and sentences match up so nicely is
part of why you can sometimes say what you think and vice
versa.”
Hinzen (2013) goes farther and proposes that language is
primarily an internal tool for thought and that syntax is the
root of the semantic and propositional organization of thought
in humans, and hence of the speciﬁcity of human thought,
compared with non-human animal thought. This, it should
be clear, also answers the second question raised in Section
“Introduction”, i.e., why does linguistic communication allows
decoupling which clearly facilitates cheating and deceiving? On
a view in which language evolved for thought, discrete inﬁnity,
semanticity and decoupling are not structural features speciﬁc
to linguistic communication, they are structural features speciﬁc
to thought and in no way dependent on whether language is
externalized for communication or not. Note that discrete inﬁnity
and decoupling, which are obvious embarrassments for a theory
of language as a communicative system in the strong sense, raise
no problem for a theory of thought: obviously, discrete inﬁnity
and decoupling are ways of exponentially increase thought
production, while the question of honesty does not arise for
thought. So, basically, all of this comes to the suggestion that
language did not evolve for communication, it evolved for
thought (as advocated by Chomsky: see, Chomsky, 2014). It
allows us to construct what medieval philosophers (Panaccio,
1999) called complex concepts, propositions, judgments, etc. This
is essentially Fodor’s Language of Thought Hypothesis (Fodor,
1975, 2008). Language was then externalized for communication,
and its externalized version inherited its core combination of
properties.
While this explains why language is such an exotic
communication system26, it does not, in and oﬀ itself, explain
why such a sophisticated system of thought is unique to humans:
why did humans—and only humans—need such a sophisticated
system of thought? Another human speciﬁcity is the richness
of the human conceptual system. While some core conceptual
mechanisms (Carey, 2009) may be shared with other species
(notably with great apes, see Gómez, 2004), the extent of the
human conceptual system is unique. This diﬀerence is obvious
from the very limited size of the vocabulary acquired by
animals engaged in language research programs (≈300 words)
as compared to the size of human vocabularies (300 words at
3-year-old, 6,000 at 6-year-old, and around 200,000 at 18-year-
old; for animals’ lexicon, see Anderson, 2004; for human lexicons
at diﬀerent ages, Bloom, 2000). While some of the diﬀerence
may be due to externalized language itself, it is highly unlikely
that this is the only explanation. Indeed, other considerations
militate against an identity between the human conceptual system
and non-human animal conceptual systems, including those of
other primates. While monkeys can learn to visually categorize
images (Fabre-Thorpe, 2003), they usually do so after intensive
training (involving thousands of trials), by contrast with young
children who learn new concepts (and the corresponding words)
instantaneously (Bloom, 2000; Waxman, 2004). Apart from any
reservation, one might have to consider visual categorization
as a proof of concept possession, this hints at highly diﬀerent
mechanisms of conceptualization. Finally, though Orangutans
may be an exception (Vonk and MacDonald, 2004), other great
ape species, though able of categorical discrimination at diﬀerent
levels of abstraction, present a highly diﬀerent proﬁle from what
is found in humans: the intermediate or basic level (roughly
corresponding to the level of the species), which is by far the most
easily accessed in humans, is the most diﬃcult for them (it is the
level at which they fail to transfer learned categories: see Vonk
and MacDonald, 2002). Thus, all in all, there are good reasons
to doubt that conceptualization follows the same path in humans
and in non-human animals.
Here, the hypothesis is that diﬀerent mechanisms operate
in human conceptualization, explaining why humans have
conceptual repertories so much wider than other species do.
Having a huge conceptual system, however, can only be useful
if the concepts can be assembled into complex concepts or
propositions (thoughts). While association can bind concepts
together (and does in both human and non-human animals), it
power is limited: at most, it could lead to sequences of concepts.
On the other hand, syntax allows structured and compositional
mental representations to emerge (see Hinzen, 2013; Fodor and
Pylyshyn, 2015 for more detailed arguments). The suggestion is
thus that syntax emerged at the mental level to organize concepts
into (propositional) thoughts.
26Because it is discontinuous from all other animal communication systems not
merely by being the only ostensive communication system (Scott-Phillips, 2015,
and see Language as a Communication System under the Ostensive Model), but
also by not having evolved for communication in the ﬁrst place.
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The obvious question is what led to the emergence of such
diﬀerent mechanisms of conceptualization in humans. Here, it
is hard to avoid speculation, but, as argued by Boeckx and
Benítez-Burraco (2014a,b) and Benítez-Burraco and Boeckx,
2015, there are important diﬀerences between modern humans
and the Neanderthal/Denisovan branch, the main one being
the globularity of the modern human skull compared to the
elongated shape of the Neanderthal/Denisovan skull. Boeckx
and Benitez-Burraco hypothesize that this change in shape
corresponds to major brain reorganization leading to greater
cerebral connectivity. Additionally, they point out that this
change is not so much due to the enlargement of the frontal
lobes as to the expansion and reorganization of parietal areas.
Now, one of the peculiarities of the Neanderthal/Denisovan
skull is the so-called Neanderthal bun, a bump on the occipital
part of the skull, corresponding to the primary visual cortex
(V5, Brodmann area 17). While there is clearly more to
conceptualization than perception, it is hard not to link the
change in human conceptualization to the speciﬁcity of human
perceptual preference for global processing of visual scenes
(Navon, 1977; Kimschi et al., 2005) as opposed to non-human
primate perceptual preference for local processing (Fagot and
Deruelle, 1997; Fagot and Tomonaga, 1999; Fagot et al., 1999,
2001). It is not impossible that the reorganization assumed
by Boeckx and Benítez-Burraco also concerned the occipital
area with capital consequences on visual preferences in modern
humans, leading to improved conceptualization.
Conclusion
While most of this paper has been dedicated to show that
language is not a communication system in the strong sense
(i.e., it did not evolve for communication) and to outline
an alternative cognitive account and its consequences for the
language-ready brain, I do not want to close it without saying
a word about the externalization of a pre-existing language
for communication. While I criticized Scott-Phillips’ (2015)
account above, I nonetheless think that it makes a lot of sense
as an account of the externalization of language. As noted
above (see Language as a Communication System under the
Ostensive Model), Scott-Phillips, following Sperber and Wilson
(1995), sees language as a sophisticated brand of ostensive
communication and proposes that a less sophisticated and
wholly unconventionalized brand of ostensive communication
preceded the formation of linguistic conventions. As he notes,
all ostensive communication rests on mind-reading abilities.
While he is content to suppose that such abilities somehow
derived from previous primate social abilities, this is unlikely
for a number of reason, the main one being that primates seem
pretty restricted in that area. At best, chimpanzees may be able of
recognizing intentions (and even that is in dispute: for a general
presentation, see Lurz, 2011). Scott-Phillips gives no reason why
mind-reading abilities would make such a jump in humans. The
hallmark of human mind reading is that, in Dennett’s (1987)
words, it involves higher-order intentions (e.g., Peter believes
that Mary believes that p), in other words, metarepresentations.
Now metarepresentation crucially depends on recursion as the
representations involved are structurally recursive. Under the
scenario I propose, the development of recursive syntax in
the Language of Thought allowed humans to develop mind-
reading abilities far in excess of anything to be found in non-
human species. This allowed humans to indulge in ostensive
communication, leading to linguistic conventions, roughly along
the lines indicated by Scott-Phillips. Note, in addition, that under
this revised scenario, acquiring words means matching words
to pre-existing concepts (as largely recognized in the lexical
acquisition literature, Bloom, 2000). This largely dispels the
problem described in the semantic version of the Lack of History
Argument I opposed to Scott-Phillips’ view (see Language as
a Communication System under the Ostensive Model). While
speaker’s meaning has to be stable on the view that language
evolved as a communication system (and clearly is not), sentence
meaning stability is quite enough to ensure the establishment
and learning of lexical conventions on the view that language is
a communication system only in a weak sense. This is because
language as a communication system in the weak sense can
piggyback on the pre-existing conceptual system and Language of
Thought, that, as argued by Hinzen (2013), ﬁxes referential and
propositional meaning.
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